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8 Doing the Deal
TAlENT CoNTrACTS IN HollyWooD
Emily CaRman and PHiliP dRakE
Since its inception, the Hollywood entertainment industry has employed contracts to regulate
a variety of industry practices that engage with and, in some instances, have helped to shape
US law. Put most simply, a contract is a legal agreement, either expressed or implied, between
two or more parties. In the USA it is governed by contract law, which varies in each state
though much legislation is shared. These laws are part of the US common law system that
draws on the body of case law produced by judicial court decisions, and this establishes legal
precedents in making future rulings. Hollywood contracts have included minimum guarantees
with distributors, block-booking agreements with exhibitors, optioning of scripts, standardised
union and guild contracts for workers and individually negotiated contracts for major talent.
Contracts and the agreements made by and through agents, managers and lawyers reveal
detailed information about the industrialisation of creative processes in Hollywood, highlight
the balance of power in negotiating deals between parties and present us with important
material through which to analyse the historical development of the Hollywood industry.
Commonplace reports about industry deal-making, as regularly announced in industry
trade papers Variety and Hollywood Reporter, reveal how Hollywood depends on such legal
frameworks and how the accumulation of past case law has informed and established contem-
porary industry practices and norms. Nowhere is this more evident than in the development
and evolution of Hollywood contracts and the laws that regulate and enforce them. Contracts
exist in every aspect of Hollywood production, distribution and exhibition, from the hiring of
below-the-line production labour to the deals that govern the division of revenues between
cinema and distributor. This chapter will focus on the industry contract that has attracted the
most visibility: the high-profile above-the-line talent contract. Most below-the-line contracts are
offered on standardised terms, usually negotiated as set contracts through recognised craft
guilds and unions. Even above-the-line talent can draw on such standard contracts – for
instance, the minimums (‘scale’) specified by the Directors Guild of America (DGA), the Screen
Actors Guild (SAG) and the Writers Guild of America (WGA) (see Chapter 9).1 However,
above-the-line contracts involving high-profile ‘talent’, actors, directors, producers and writers,
which are commonplace in many Hollywood features, are individually negotiated and have, over
time, evolved into large, complex legal agreements, negotiated by agents and lawyers who rep-
resent their clients’ interests.
Although some scholars have studied film industry contracts, there has been relatively little
research on how such contracts, and the processes through which they have been negotiated
and contested, enact forms of agency.2 Contracts formalise promises, helping to codify, hierar-
chise and publicise the market value for talent, establishing their place in the industry through
salary compensation and recognition of status via possessory credits, expense accounts and so
on. In short, they provide the necessary legal frameworks to allow Hollywood’s industrial
processes to function. For example, the agreement to use an ‘A-list’ actor to perform and pro-
mote a particular film requires the licensing of rights (i.e., the use of that actor’s services, spec-
ified assignment of their image rights) that are negotiated by the actor’s agent and lawyer with
the studio or production company (which has its own legal representation). Such contracts also
spell out in great detail the precise terms of their employment duration and compensation.
More recently, ‘pay or play’ contracts have included the requirement for payment whether or
not the film is produced. The contracting of the services of high-profile freelance talent has,
since the 1930s, often been via a loan-out agreement with their personal service corporation,
done for tax efficiency (see Chapter 7 for more on the practice of loan-out companies). In
addition, such an agreement specifies various add-ons (such as travel expenses), possessory
screen credits, promotional duties and, crucially, extensive annexes with definitions of the key
contractual terms (such as ‘net profits’, ‘break-even’ and so on).
our aim in this chapter is to suggest that the analysis of contracts – and their historical evo-
lution – can offer scholars important historical evidence about the functioning of Hollywood’s
organisational and industrial processes. First, we trace the evolution of the long-term ‘option
contract’ for talent in the vertically integrated Hollywood studio system. As ‘personal service
contracts’, these exclusive agreements were originally part of the California Civil Code Section
1980 – later transferred to the labor Code Section 2855 as part of the Industrial labor
relations Act of 1937 – and were widely used by the studios until they were abandoned in the
1950s in favour of individually negotiated freelance deals.3 However, even during the zenith of
the old studio system, motion picture actors began to contest the legality of these binding
option contracts – most famously the Warner Bros. stars James Cagney and Bette Davis –
especially after the establishment of their box-office power. The most prominent legal challenge
came in 1944, when the actress olivia de Havilland sued Warner Bros. over their attempt to
extend her contract by adding on her cumulative suspension time when she had refused film
assignments, even though her seven-year contract had expired. The ‘De Havilland law’ (as it is
referred to in legal parlance, although the actress’s name was misspelled by the Court and
henceforth the case was published as ‘de Haviland’) remains the seminal case that interpreted
Section 2855. Moreover, the case reveals how California public policy laws shaped the frame-
work of the talent contract in the studio era.4
Second, this chapter will analyse the development of complex and intricate contracts devel-
oped through the 1950s to present-day Hollywood, including ‘gross’ and ‘net’ profit and ‘break-
even’ definitions, extensive possessory credit demands and – in comparison to union and guild
minimum contracts – inflated up-front salaries as well as deferred compensation. The Buchwald
v. Paramount lawsuit of 1990–2 offers a ground-breaking legal case as it demonstrates not only
the complexity of recent Hollywood contracts, but also how the creative accounting routinely
adopted in Hollywood since the 1970s developed as a studio response to the increased profit
participation demands from freelancing stars, leading to a shift by major A-list talent towards
gross rather than net profit participation contracts. We conclude the chapter by assessing the
current applications of the de Haviland and Buchwald decisions in recent contract negotiations
and legal disputes in Hollywood.5
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the talent Contract in Studio-era hollywood
From the early days of cinema, the studio contract was a pliable document. The standard
studio contract could span anywhere from two to seven years, and for many artists in
Hollywood, ranging from character actors to top stars, directors and writers, these contracts
guaranteed steady employment and ensured regular film production schedules.  As Tom
Kemper puts it, a studio contract represented ‘an achievement all of its own ... as an object of
desire and value for artists’ in the studio era.6 During the 1920s, the typical Hollywood studio
contract for actors was limited to a five-year term – until August of 1931, when the California
State Senate officially approved Section 1980 statute of the Civil Code that extended personal
service contracts to seven years, which enabled film studios and producers to hold exclusive,
long-term agreements with talent.7 The law reads as follows: ‘A contract to render personal
service … may nevertheless be enforced against the person contracting to render such serv-
ice, for a term not beyond a period of seven years from the commencement of service.’8 The
only clue that this law pertained to the film industry was in its definition of personal service: ‘to
perform or render service of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary, or intellectual character,
which gives it peculiar value’.9This language is reminiscent of the terminology used in the studio
talent contracts that define the performance of an actor as a commodity.10 Thus, motion pic-
ture actors’ labour was legally recognised as a ‘master/servant continuous employment agree-
ment’ to a specific studio, producer, or corporate entity, bound by contract.11
Not surprisingly then, the new seven-year option contract perplexed Hollywood’s acting
community, and these sentiments were voiced in the industry trades – for example, in
‘objections to the 7-yr. Contract’, in Variety in 1931:
New California law allowing seven-year contracts is not looked on favorably by talent, who see
it only as an advantage to the producer. It gives the film company a chance to shake the player
at option time, but binds the artist for full length of time, according to the players’ side. Present
five-year contracts are called only that in name because of the semi-yearly options to be taken
at the producer’s preference. Adding two years to these would only lengthen the agony, these
contractees contend.12
Here Variety illuminated the clashes over the contract between producers and actors at play
in the early 1930s, as both the existing and new law favoured the producer over the actor to
exercise renewal options. By this time, Hollywood had weathered financial challenges from
the conversion to sound film and the economic hardships inflicted by the Depression, and the
major studios used the climate of fiscal uncertainty to subvert the empowered and financially
lucrative contracts that popular, money-making stars had enjoyed in the 1920s as they reor-
ganised their business practices to be a vertically integrated, big business oligopoly in the
1930s.
Indeed, the studio long-term option contract was an ingenious legal document that
reserved the studio’s exclusive right to ‘option’ the services of talent every six months for up
to seven years that usually included an increase in salary raise at each renewal. It especially
enabled the studios to develop and promote a stable of stars who epitomised the company’s
signature style as a visual trademark, like Joan Crawford and Clark Gable of MGM, for 
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example. The ‘option’ worked in the following ways, as Tino Balio explains: ‘Every six months
the studio reviewed an actor’s progress and decided whether or not to pick up the option. If
the studio dropped the option, the actor was out of work; if the studio picked up the option,
the actor continued on the payroll for another six months.’13 Thus, talent did not always have
the corresponding authority to opt out of their contracts if they so wished. If there was a dis-
pute about roles or salary, these long-term option contracts enabled the studios to suspend
talent without pay if they refused film assignments, disputed the terms of their contracts, or
desired to become freelance artists. As Jane Gaines writes,
Suspension effectively stopped the seven-year contract clock, thus adding more time to the
actor’s required employment for every day he or she was laid off. Actors who wanted to be
free to work for other studios on scripts of their own choice felt trapped by the compulsory
extension of their contracts.14
Understood in this context, movie stardom appeared to be what Balio characterises as a ‘daz-
zling illusion to the degradations of servitude’ during the 1930s.15 What emerged, then, was a
paradox between the stars’ ‘glamorous’ images and their material labour as contractually obli-
gated workers in the film industry; although they were extremely well-compensated employees,
stars still had to conform to the decrees of studio bosses and the hierarchies of their oligopo-
listic business practices.
The key legal disputes over the studio long-term option contracts in the 1930s resulted
from its suspension policies, mainly at Warner Bros., with actors James Cagney, Bette Davis and
olivia de Havilland being the demonstrative examples. All attempted to get out of their long-
term contract agreements with the studio, but for different rationales and legal justifications.
Each lawsuit pertained to California Civil Code Section 1980/labor Code Section 2855, but
only de Havilland’s resulted in the setting of a new legal precedent. Cagney brought a lawsuit
against Warner Bros. in 1936 to cancel his contract due to the studio’s failure to deliver on
verbal promises that he appear in no more than four films a year. The actor’s original legal argu-
ment had been that Warner Bros. over-exposed his image by requiring him to appear in more
than four pictures. Ultimately, though, it was a violation of the actor’s billing clause in his contract
that persuaded Judge Charles l. Bogue to rule in Cagney’s favour in los Angeles Superior
Court on 3 March 1936 and nullify his contract, effectively declaring him a free agent.16 While
Warner Bros. appealed the decision to the California Supreme Court, no other major studio
risked employing Cagney, in case the court reversed the decision. During this period, the actor
made only two films for the independent production company Grand National (both of which
lost money and were a great personal financial loss to the actor, since he also produced the
films). This adverse experience led to Cagney’s return to Warner Bros. prior to the California
Supreme Court verdict.17 Nevertheless, his experience attests to how Hollywood actors used
the legal system to attain increased leverage over their celebrity and, in this instance, it indirectly
led to a better contract and working terms at Warner Bros. When he returned to the studio
in 1938, his new contract specified eleven films in four years, with story approval and star billing,
as well as the right to make his own radio appearances and personal endorsements of com-
mercial products.18
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A similar situation occurred in 1936 with Bette Davis, Warner Bros.’ most prominent female
star, over her film assignments, which she felt were unjustifiable given her recent Best Actress
oscar for dangerous (1935). She rejected Warner Bros.’ new contract offer with only a ‘vague
promise of better roles’, after which the studio placed her on suspension.19 Davis ultimately fled
to England to make a film with Toeplitz Productions. Warner Bros. sued her, citing their suspension
policy in their contract with the actress, and the studio won the case in the English courts in
october 1936. Davis acquiesced to Warner Bros. and returned to los Angeles to sign a new con-
tract, but it was still bereft of any star billing or story selection guarantees.20 Nonetheless, Davis’s
experience echoes Cagney’s in that her recalcitrance with the studio paid off – Jack Warner did
give Davis better roles in ‘A’ pictures, one of which, Jezebel, was purchased specifically for her and
resulted in a second Best Actress oscar for her in 1938.
Cagney and Davis, along with other Warner Bros. stars, battled the studio through litigation
in order to gain some degree of control over their careers rather than simply to defeat the studio
or invalidate their long-term contracts.21 But, as Kemper notes, these legal battles ‘also betray poor
management, a dimension that is generally elided in most histories on classical Hollywood’ and
that ‘Cagney and Davis were stuck with bad contracts’ from an ‘equally bad strategy and bad
countermoves’ by their agents.22 Indeed, a long-term contract could be empowering to talent and
work to their advantage in studio-era Hollywood, especially with the help of a good agent. Savvy
talent agents like Myron Selznick, Charles Feldman, leland Hayward and others were instrumental
in bargaining for and the writing of contracts for their star clients in studio negotiations.23 As their
market value grew, it was customary practice for talent to renegotiate long-term contracts with
elements of creative control, including director, cast, crew and/or story approvals, as well as pro-
tection from overwork, and innovative financial agreements such as percentage shares that
awarded them a cut of their films’ box-office profits. In some cases, stars went freelance, working
independently at an array of studios on specific film projects of their choosing. For instance, Carole
lombard exited Paramount after a seven-year long-term option contract in 1937 to negotiate
two impressive freelance deals with Paramount and Selznick International Pictures that not only
made her Hollywood’s highest-paid star of that year, but also bestowed to her several contractual
provisions that included her choice of director, cinematographer, co-star, producer or screenwriter,
story discretion, designer of choice and/or make-up, hairstylist and even her publicist and a ‘no
loan-out’ clause.24 What’s more, these agents regularly requested profit participation deals for
their top clients. For example, in 1933 and 1934, negotiated by Selznick and Hayward, Katherine
Hepburn signed a series of deals with the studio rKo that allocated her between 5 and 12.5 per
cent of the gross receipts (depending on the total box-office takings), plus up-front salary. These
contracts, while not widespread, were also not unusual for top talent. For example, Feldman
arranged for a lucrative deal for client Irene Dunne in 1933 that gave her 15 per cent of her film’s
gross receipts once it had recouped twice the amount of the film’s budget back in distribution;
she collected a respectable salary from the third film that she made in this agreement, Roberta
(1935), with her percentage earnings reaching a grand total of $157,948.50 by November 1941.25
A 1934 deal between MGM and the Marx Brothers offered 15 per cent of the gross receipts for
a day at the Races (1937) and a night at the Opera (1935). Claudette Colbert, loaned out by
Paramount and represented by Feldman, received $65,000 plus 2 per cent of the gross receipts
for the 1934 Universal film imitation of life.26
DOING THE DEAL 213
However, the widespread practice of freelancing can be also attributed to another case
involving the film industry, that of de Haviland v. Warner Bros. in 1944, which resulted from the
lawsuit olivia de Havilland brought against Warner Bros., who tried to apply their suspension
policy and prevent the actress from becoming a free agent after the expiration of her seven-
year long-term contract. The verdict for de Havilland’s case litigated Section 2855 of the CA
labor Code and, in doing so, set a landmark legal precedent for the US entertainment industry
that legally recognised artists as free agents.27
the De havilland law
Although the de Havilland lawsuit is continually cited in American film and legal histories as an
important achievement for screen actors’ rights, the key details and events leading up to her case
and how it pertained to the Section 2855 statute, as well as how the case impacted Hollywood
talent contracts thereafter, merits more detailed scrutiny. The actress first entered into a long-
term contract with Warner Bros. in 1935 after appearing in their film production of Shakespeare’s
a midsummer night’s dream (1935).28 Her weekly salary began at $250, and rose each time the
studio exercised the option in her contract, culminating in $2,500 in 1943. yet her contract did
not give the actress any creative discretion over her film roles, and she found herself typecast as
the brunette ingénue at the studio, appearing often as Errol Flynn’s love interest in films like The
adventures of Robin Hood (1938). De Havilland finally received a career-changing role when she
convinced Jack Warner to loan her out for the plum role of Melanie Hamilton Wilkes in David o.
Selznick’s blockbuster Gone with the Wind (1939), for which she received an Academy Award
nomination for Best Supporting Actress. De Havilland followed up this success with another
oscar-nominated performance, this time as Best Actress, for Hold Back the dawn (1941), when
she was loaned out to Paramount. Back at her home studio, the actress felt that she kept receiving
lacklustre material, despite her proven talent and market value; as De Havilland herself recalled:
I finally began to do interesting work like Melanie, but always on loan out to another studio ...
So I realised that at Warner Bros. I was never going to have the work that I so much wanted to
have. I knew that I had an audience, that people really were interested in my work, and they
would go to see a film because I was in it, and I had a responsibility toward them, among other
things. I couldn’t bear to disappoint them by doing indifferent work on an indifferent film.29
The emboldened actress began declining assigned film roles and, by 1943, she had been suspended
by Warner Bros. five times.30 It is interesting to consider the studio perspective in their handling of
de Havilland’s career. Although Warner Bros. had a reputation for their careful management of top
talent, Jack Warner found the actress’s claims of unworthy roles ‘ridiculous’. Warner elaborated his
position in this studio memo from 1943, noting that de Havilland:
made no complaint about the pictures that she did make, which were successful, so we
certainly know what we were doing equally as much in the pictures we wanted her to do that
she would not appear in ... If Miss de Havilland wants to compare all pictures with Gone with the
Wind I will get David Selznick, Daniel o’Shea, and every other top producer to testify that such
a comparison would be absurd.31
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From the point of view of Warner Bros., the
actress had unrealistic expectations – not
every Warner film in which de Havilland
appeared could be of the quality and stature
of her loan-out films.
Perhaps the financial success of her
Warner Bros. films explains why de
Havilland entered into negotiations with the
studio to renew her agreement with the
studio but this time on a non-exclusive
basis. The actress asked for a three-picture
deal at a salary of $75,000 per film, with the
following rationale, as outlined by producer
Steve Trilling:
She originally preferred to be free at the end of her present contract, but realizes Warner Bros.
have been very good for her and probably in some respects it would be best to be tied up
with us. But she wants to reserve the right to do at least one outside picture each year, so that
when a Hold Back the dawn … role does come along she would be in a position to accept.32
Trilling concluded the memo by asking his boss whether he had any interest in pursuing this
offer, which Jack Warner rejected, even though he had sanctioned similar deals with freelance
talent at the studio.33 Instead, he elected to extend de Havilland’s long-term contract by adding
up the cumulative sum of her suspension time to extend her original seven-year contract
(approximately nine months).
In response, de Havilland’s agents, Phil Berg and Bert Allenberg, had a plan of legal action. They
advised the actress to seek a judgment declaring that her prior contract was unenforceable after
seven years because it was a violation of the California labor Code 2855. De Havilland proceeded
with the lawsuit and, as expected, Warner Bros. countered that the actress had ‘effectively waived
the protection of section 2855 by her breaches of the contract’, which were due to personal
choice, and ‘was thus stopped from disputing the validity of the contract extensions’.34The actress
expected to lose in the Superior Court and planned on appealing for a win in the Appellate Court,
but, to her surprise, the Superior Court ruled in her favour, thereby guaranteeing the rights of the
employee over the corporation. Warner Bros. immediately appealed to the Appellate Court, which
upheld the prior ruling and sided with the actress. Arbitrating Judge Charles S. Burnell ruled that:
Seven years of time is fixed as the maximum time for which they may contract for their
services without the right to change employers. … [T]hereafter they may make a change if
they deem it necessary. … As one grows more experienced and skilful there should be a
reasonable opportunity to move upward and employ his abilities to the best advantage and
for the highest obtainable compensation.35
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De havilland playing second fiddle to errol Flynn in
The Adventures of Robin Hood (1938) (BFi)
The court’s ruling underscored an ar tist’s right to the highest salary possible contingent
upon their market value, which in de Havilland’s case equated to becoming a freelance
artist. At the same time, this ruling did not eradicate the seven-year option contract norm;
in fact, the court reaffirmed the legality of it in their interpretation of Section 2855 as a
strong public policy that could not be extended beyond the calendar time of seven years
because doing so would ‘nullify any practical effect of the statute’.36 Hence, the de Haviland
v. Warner Bros. verdict upheld the right for Hollywood talent to be free agents and provided
a legal path for freelancing in the film industry, but only after they had completed the full
term of any prior contractual obligations to a maximum of seven years. This was the major
legal obstacle that derailed the case brought against Warner Bros. by Bette Davis in 1936;
she had signed an exclusive long-term option contract that prevented her ability to work
elsewhere. 
After the conclusion of her court battles, olivia de Havilland received multiple freelance
offers from other major studios, despite Jack Warner’s attempt to bar other major studios
and producers from hiring her.37 The first of these was Paramount’s To Each His Own
(1946), which brought not only critical praise, but also de Havilland’s first Best Actress
oscar. The De Havilland law was part of several larger film industry shifts that occurred in
postwar Hollywood that helped to furnish the free agency that largely remains in place for
A-list screen talent today. Factors included: the slow-down of film production after the
Paramount Decree, which forced the studios to divest themselves of their exhibition chains
(for more on the legal impacts of this decision, see Chapter 4), as well as the emergent rival
medium of television, which began to chip away at Hollywood’s audience – both of which
resulted in less predictable demand for product and a decline in film production. Moreover,
it was no longer economically feasible to
retain high-priced studio talent on long-
term contracts with the downturn in pro-
duction, as the studios needed to cut their
overheads. Thus, it was both cheaper and
lower risk for the studios to hire film talent
on freelance contracts. Nonetheless, the
De Havilland law continues to be invoked
in contractual legal disputes over Section
2855 in enter tainment industries, such as
the popular music business, as Jonathan
Blaufarb has shown in an analysis of the
lawsuit that singer Melissa Manchester
brought against Arista records in 1981.38
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De havilland as a freelance star in her oscar-winning
role as Jody norris in To Each His Own (1946) (BFi)
Post-Studio System Deal-making and evolution of the gross and net
Participation Contract
Freelancing would increasingly become standard practice for A-list Hollywood talent, espe-
cially in the postwar years after the 1948 Paramount Decree verdict declared that the ver-
tically integrated practices of the film industry were anti-competitive (see Chapter 4).
Continuing the negotiating tactics established by Selznick, Feldman and Hayward, the agents
lew Wasserman, ray Stark, Phil Gersh and Irving ‘Swifty’ lazar were instrumental in innovat-
ing contracts for their clients and pushing for deferred compensation via complex profit-shar-
ing deals. By 20 January 1953, industry changes in talent contracts were such that the front
page of The Hollywood Reporter could announce: ‘long-term Deals on the Way out’. The
accompanying article detailed how only a handful of stars remained under contract with the
studios, citing reasons such as poor box-office returns, studio down-sizing and a preference
by studios for open market bidding for talent. By the end of the 1950s the majority of
Hollywood talent were on non-exclusive freelance contracts, usually contracted on a film-
by-film basis. The change is striking. In 1944 there were 804 actors under contract with the
major studios, by 1961 it had declined to just 164 and it continued to fall throughout the
1960s.39 As we have established, such structural changes in the industry only increased the
importance of agents in the packaging of talent and the reliance on talent as guarantors of
finance and underwriters of risk. The new freedom for the most powerful star talent allowed
them to negotiate contractual terms in their favour, especially through the development of
more complex participation contracts, where talent was paid a percentage of contractually
defined box-office proceeds, often movable at various points, after contractually agreed
deductions.
Perhaps the most famous net participation contract was MCA agent lew Wasserman’s
deal with Universal for James Stewart’s services on Winchester ’73 (1950) and Harvey (1950).
Stewart was paid $200,000 for his work on Harvey but on Winchester ’73 he substituted his
usual fixed compensation for 50 per cent of the film’s net profits, payable only when receipts
in excess of twice the negative costs (i.e., the production cost of the film) had been recouped
and then calculated after various deductions had been made (distribution fees, expenses,
studio overheads).40 However, the most notable element of this deal was that Stewart effec-
tively became a financial backer of the film, forgoing his up-front salary and instead taking on
a significant risk in anticipation of a larger reward if the film was successful, thus reducing the
overall risk to Universal. If the film failed, he would have received no salary, but box-office suc-
cess promised a lucrative return. The film grossed approximately $2.25 million, paying Stewart
a reported $600,000 (50 per cent of the net profits, calculated out of the distributor’s share
of box-office receipts after deductions).41 However, it was not a template for the contempo-
rary ‘net profits’ deals that followed, which, as a rule, do not forgo all up-front compensation,
as this did, and are rarely on such generous terms. Although called a ‘net profit’ contract, as
Mark Weinstein notes it was really an unusual ‘adjusted gross’ contract as Stewart was paid a
large percentage of the gross-after-deductions by deferring all his salary.42 However, the con-
tract was striking in pointing out how a major established star such as Stewart was willing to
underwrite the risk of a film through his deferment of salary, by instead accepting contingent
compensation.
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Concepts such as ‘gross receipts’ and ‘net profits’ were routinely defined in the annexes of
postwar talent deals and, with the ending of long-term contracts, top talent saw themselves as
partners rather than employees of the studios, aware of their power in raising finance and pro-
moting the film. Again, it was talent agents who paved the way for the package-unit system in
which they and managers became as fundamental to film production as financiers and produc-
ers. Wasserman was even prescient enough to recognise the importance of television and
residuals for his clients, adding clauses negotiating future television rights, such as Alfred
Hitchcock’s lucrative franchise contract for the 1950s television series alfred Hitchcock
Presents.43 Wasserman also acted as financial advisor to his clients, developing complex sub-
contracting and tax-sheltering companies that helped them avoid paying hefty personal income
tax. The star independent production trend became more pronounced in the 1950s, with
examples such as Kirk Douglas’s Bryna Productions, Burt lancaster and his agent Harold
Hecht’s Hecht–lancaster, John Wayne’s Wayne–Fellows Productions and The Filmmakers,
founded by actress, turned director, producer and writer Ida lupino, with her husband producer
Collier young and writer Malvin Wald.44
Wasserman also persuaded the SAG, via its president (and MCA client) ronald reagan,
to grant MCA a secret ten-year waiver to both represent talent and make television pro-
ductions, concealing a major conflict of interest. This gave MCA a substantial advantage over
the studios as it could package talent and control contracts. In the 1950s MCA became the
leading supplier of prime-time programming to television and was able to package talent
and dictate the terms of their contracts to the television networks. This lasted until the
1960s, when MCA bought Universal Pictures and had to relinquish its talent agency.
Established through his talent agency as a leading industry powerbroker, Wasserman was
highly influential for many years at Universal, being instrumental in installing Jack Valenti at
the MPAA and remaining a close friend of US President ronald reagan at the White
House.45
During the 1960s and 70s, building on the negotiating success of Wasserman and others,
talent and their agents began to demand both up-front fixed compensation and ‘back-end’
compensation in the form of profit participation. The weakened studios, and the rise of inde-
pendent producers, meant that stars often took on producing roles and increasingly worked
outside the major studios. less powerful talent (often writers and producers) were more
likely to be rewarded with net participation, which represents a percentage of profits after
deductions of costs (including gross participation). Through the 1980s and 90s, higher gross
percentage participation for A-list stars became more common, as did the packaging of talent
by agencies such as the powerful Creative Artists Agency (CAA), under Michael ovitz, a
former William Morris agent who co-founded CAA in 1975. The clout of CAA during the
1980s and 90s was extraordinary, as they represented major Hollywood talent including
actors Tom Cruise, Sylvester Stallone, Kevin Costner, Barbra Streisand and directors including
Steven Spielberg and Barry levinson. However, even for the exclusive A-list, very few of
these contracts were true ‘first dollar gross’ contracts, but were subject to negotiated and
agreed ‘off the top’ deductions of costs by the studio (thus being a form of adjusted gross
contract, often expressed as ‘gross after recoupment’ contracts). Early $10 million plus
adjusted gross compensation contracts were struck at the end of the 1980s by Sylvester
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Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger. The increase in gross participation by the most bank-
able talent (including Eddie Murphy and Tom Cruise in the 1980s, and Demi Moore, Julia
roberts, Tom Hanks and Jim Carrey in the 1990s) had the effect of further diminishing the
likelihood of net profits, and hence receiving any deferred payment through participation in
the ‘net’ for less powerful players. This delineation of power was not limited to actors. less
glamorous, but at times even more well-remunerated, were producers of franchises such as
Jon Peters and Peter Guber (from the Batman franchise) and top producer-directors such
as George lucas, Steven Spielberg and, in the 2000s, Peter Jackson.46 The importance of
negotiating gross participation in a successful franchise was infamously illustrated by the ven-
erable actor Alec Guinness, who, in the 1970s, chose to defer some of his salary for the initial
three Star Wars films and instead negotiated to receive 2 per cent of the gross participation
that was due to producer, George lucas. By doing so, he earned more than all his other roles
combined: by 2009, a reported £56 million, or approximately $84 million.47 For mission
impossible, in 1996, Tom Cruise was widely reported as receiving a fixed payment of $20 mil-
lion plus profit participation of 25 per cent of the gross receipts. According to Edward J.
Epstein, for the 2003 film Terminator 3: Rise of the machines, Arnold Schwarzenegger was paid
$29.25 million up-front for his role, plus $1.5 million of perks (including use of a private jet)
and, once a defined break-even point was reached, 20 per cent of the gross receipts from all
worldwide sources including (very unusually) not only theatrical, but also video, DVD, televi-
sion and licensing revenues.48
Such contracts are, of course, exceptional, and enabled the most powerful talent to
become major financial investors in a film or franchise. Successful films that spawn franchises
uniquely allow star talent to exploit the monopoly power they hold over their images and
performances – they (and the studios) also recognise that successful franchises often spawn
lower-risk sequels. The centrality of Schwarzenegger’s image to the first two Terminator films
was such that he could leverage this monopoly power in his remarkable deal for the third
film. However, whether this reflects the true bankability of unique talent is less certain, as
Arthur De Vany has noted.49 The reboot of the Terminator franchise in 2009, Terminator
Salvation, with Christian Bale taking the role of John Connor, grossed $371 million worldwide
at the box office, a lesser though not dissimilar amount to Terminator 3’s $430 million (albeit
significantly less after adjusting for inflation).50 other than a fleeting appearance in vir tual
form, Schwarzenegger is absent from the reboot. Terminator Salvation, while critically unsuc-
cessful, performed decently at the box office without its previous lead, drawing instead on
the box-office lure of Bale, a major star following his lead role in the reboot of the Batman
film series. Both the Terminator and Batman franchises demonstrate that the monopoly
nature of star power is rarely absolute, and that major star talent for certain films can often
be replaced. Franchise reboots, such as the amazing Spider-man series (2012–), have
deployed new talent to potentially successfully reduce the costs associated with above-the-
line talent and profit participation, as well as renew a familiar narrative through the casting
of new stars. It is also notable that the hierarchies of star talent established by contracts are
also gendered, with fewer female stars in recent years negotiating such lucrative contracts –
especially in terms of fixed compensation – as their A-list male counterparts, and far fewer
women commanding star roles over the age of forty-five.51
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A consequence of the rise in freelancing talent, and the ongoing evolution of contempo-
rary talent contract forms, has been to gradually shift much of the core emphasis of the
Hollywood studios towards the more lucrative and less risky activity of distribution. Deal struc-
tures favour the distributor over the producer or net profit participant, as studio distribution
charges and overheads are deducted before participation for all but very top ‘first dollar’ talent.
Indeed, gross participation by talent can have the effect of actually increasing studio profits, as
the costs of gross participation are charged to the film, and the studios are able to add charges
and overheads on this charge. With a distribution fee often as high as 30–40 per cent, depend-
ing on territory, plus an additional distribution charge, and the deduction of production costs
and gross participation, the likelihood of net profits on most studio movies becomes increas-
ingly small. Instead, film costs are inflated, especially by very top A-list talent who, as we have
seen, can cost $10–25 million, plus 10–20 per cent ‘off the top’ gross profit participation, and
by large distribution charges, fees and studio overheads that do not reflect actual costs of dis-
tribution.52 As a way of controlling these costs, studios increasingly use a ‘cash-break’ contract
where levels of percentage participation are only triggered when a film moves into positive
‘cash-break-even’ territory, reducing the potential risk attached to star compensation (similar
to the James Stewart deal outlined earlier). Sometimes termed ‘creative accounting’ or even
simply ‘Hollywood accounting’, this process offers a key explanation for many of the clauses in
contemporary Hollywood contracts. Furthermore, the method of allocating video revenues
into the participation pot, and, more recently, revenues from online distribution, have been fur-
ther key points of negotiation by talent. Although rarely on as generous terms as the gross par-
ticipation deals for theatrical revenues, significant ‘back-end’ royalties on these revenues can be
negotiated by the most powerful talent. In addition, all actors and directors are paid residuals
(required by the SAG/American Federation of Television and radio Artists and the DGA)
when a film is released on video or broadcast on television.
Contemporary hollywood Contracts: Revisiting Buchwald v. Paramount (1990)
By the 1980s, as we have outlined, the freelance contracting of talent was well established and
agencies such as CAA negotiated lucrative deals on behalf of their star clients. yet, in January
1984, just thirty years after The Hollywood Reporter announced the end of long-term studio
deals, the los angeles Herald Examiner proclaimed that ‘Studio–Star Marriages Make a
Comeback’.53 The story went on to detail how three comedy stars – richard Pryor, Eddie
Murphy and Michael Keaton – had signed to long-term contracts with studios that included
large up-front fees, plus gross participation: Columbia’s multiple film deal with Pryor was
reported as being worth $40 million over five years; Paramount offered Murphy, having starred
in just two pictures (albeit the hugely successful 48 Hrs [1982] and Trading Places [1983]) the
sum of $15 million, plus approximately 15 per cent of the gross, for his next five films (later
revised upwards to $8 million per picture); and 20th Century-Fox offered Keaton a deal guar-
anteeing he could make four from five films with the studio and also direct one.54 By 26 August
1987 Variety reported that, following the success of Beverley Hills Cop 2, Murphy’s contract with
Paramount had again been renegotiated to offer him even greater payment – approximately
$15 million per film – in a new open-ended five-picture deal extending into the 1990s.55 In the
article Murphy was quoted as saying:
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When you make a deal to … do like five pictures, and the (first) movie did so well, we went
back and said, ‘Hey, let’s renegotiate’ … ‘This is a business where you renegotiate deals. Do I
believe in living up to contracts? yes. Do I believe in being underpaid for something I do? No.’56
In the same article, Paramount President Sidney Ganis proclaimed Murphy the ‘bona fide
number-one box-office star in all the world’ based on the box-office grosses of his Paramount
features – totalling more than $632 million domestically to that date, and almost equally lucra-
tive overseas.57 Following this contract, Murphy’s next proposed film was called ‘Quest’, which
was retitled – eventually becoming the hugely profitable 1988 Paramount comedy, Coming to
america.
Coming to america reunited Trading Places director John landis with Murphy, and went on
to gross $288 million worldwide on its initial release.58 However, it also gave rise to a landmark
lawsuit that opened up Hollywood contracts and questioned the routine accounting processes
upon which these contracts are based. As we will outline, the high-profile lawsuit Buchwald v.
Paramount was revealing as it caused major ripples through Hollywood, as Paramount had to
disclose both how deals were struck (in particular, nuances of the net profits contract) and to
justify how such a film could have made no net profit despite being one of the top box-office
hits of the year.
In considering this lawsuit, the details of what underpinned the case need to be briefly
outlined.59 In early 1982, Art Buchwald, a famous American writer and humourist, wrote an
eight-page screen treatment for a film, titled ‘It’s a Crude, Crude World’, later renamed ‘King
for a Day’, based on an incident he had witnessed on the state visit of the Shah of Iran to
America.60 The story focused on the visit to the USA of an extremely wealthy, handsome
and spoiled young African king. In Buchwald’s treatment, the king is taken on a grand tour of
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eddie Murphy, star of, and gross profit participant in, Coming to America (1988). Produced by Paramount Pictures
and eddie Murphy Productions; distributed by Paramount Pictures; directed by John landis
the USA and arrives at the White House, where a remark made by the President infuriates
him. While in the USA, he is deposed, deserted by his entourage and left destitute. He ends
up in a Washington ghetto, stripped of his clothes and befriended by a woman. He obtains
employment as a waiter and, in order to avoid extradition, marries the woman who
befriended him and lives happily ever after.61 Buchwald’s friend, a producer named Alain
Bernheim (who later also became a plaintiff in the case) registered the treatment with the
WGA. Bernheim suggested to Buchwald he reduced the treatment from eight to two to
three pages, with the view to a friend – louis Malle – directing the film.62 later that year,
Bernheim met Jeffrey Katzenberg, then Head of Production at Paramount, to pitch the story
for Eddie Murphy to star, who was under contract with them for the five-film deal mentioned
above.63 By February 1983, Paramount and Bernheim set up a legal agreement for the latter
to produce the film – should it be green-lit – that entitled him to payment and, in March that
year, Buchwald sold the rights to the story and concept to Paramount.64 Paramount then
engaged another writer, Tab Murphy, to write a script, and budgeted the film at $12 million,
with John landis to direct.65 A script was delivered in September 1983 but reportedly not
well received by the studio. Paramount extended their option on the treatment, while seek-
ing another writer to deliver a further script by october 1984, eventually bringing the devel-
opment costs to in excess of $418,000.66 However, by early 1985, progress on the film
began to stall. A new writing team had been engaged but then aborted and, in March 1985,
Bernheim was informed by Paramount that the project had been abandoned and was in
turnaround.67 After Paramount’s option on the treatment lapsed, Buchwald and Bernheim
set about selling the idea to Warner Bros. and, in May 1986, optioned the treatment to
them.68
However, in August 1985 a new idea was developed by Paramount titled ‘Ambassador At
large’ and, by 1987, this had developed into a film idea, the aforementioned ‘The Quest’, based
on a story by Eddie Murphy and written by two more writers. In November 1987, Buchwald
learned that Paramount were planning to shoot a movie with a very similar premise to his
treatment, in which Eddie Murphy was to play an African prince who comes to America to find
a wife. Paramount insisted that the film was unrelated to Buchwald’s original idea; however,
despite this Warner Bros. abandoned Buchwald’s project once they learned of a film with a sim-
ilar premise.69 outraged by Paramount’s denial, Buchwald and Bernheim decided to sue the
studio for 19 per cent of the net profits of Coming to america, as would have been their con-
tractual entitlement had their film been made. In the contracts originally agreed, Buchwald was
due 1.5 per cent of net profits, plus $65,000 payment, while as producer Bernheim was due
17.5 per cent of net profits, plus $200,000 payment.70
The lawsuit was extensive and took over two years. Although the case revolved around a
two and a half-page treatment, it produced over 10,000 pages of sworn testimony, 200 plead-
ings, and – to their discomfort – Paramount was forced to make over a million pages of doc-
uments available to the court.71 From a dispute over a two-page treatment, an estimated $12
million was spent fighting the lawsuit, producing appellate court records running to 37,000
pages.72 The courts examined at length the legality of the studio’s contract with Buchwald and
Bernheim, and engaged in a detailed discussion about the definition and calculation of the net
profits contract.73
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The initial stages of the lawsuit resulted in significant wins for Buchwald and Bernheim, rock-
ing the industry. The first stage of the action was to determine if, indeed, the concept for
Coming to america was based upon a ‘material element’ within or ‘inspired by’ Buchwald’s treat-
ment. This ‘material element’ test was received to consider if there was a prima facie case to
answer – clearly the issue of compensation would have been irrelevant unless it could be
proven to have been based on Buchwald’s idea. This raised a number of important questions.
Despite similarities, the film also had key differences from the treatment. However, case law had
established that the ‘test for similarity’ was lowered if the court could establish that there been
access to the treatment, which they duly did. The court also noted that both scripts included
key ‘gimmicks’, such as Eddie Murphy playing multiple characters and the use of a mop to foil
a robbery. The Court, however, was clear that this was not a case about Eddie Murphy’s own
integrity, stating that:
At the outset the Court desires to indicate what this case is and is not about. It is not about
whether Art Buchwald or Eddie Murphy is more creative. It is clear to the Court that each of
these men is a creative genius in his own field and each is an uniquely American institution. This
case is also not about whether Eddie Murphy made substantial contributions to the film
‘Coming to America.’ The Court is convinced he did. Finally, this case is not about
whether Eddie Murphy ‘stole’ Art Buchwald’s concept ‘King for a Day.’ rather, this case is
primarily a breach of contract case between Buchwald and Paramount (not Murphy)
which must be decided by reference to the agreement between the parties and the
rules of contract construction, as well as the principals of law enunciated in the
applicable legal authorities.74
The court duly established there was, indeed, a ‘substantial similarity’ between Buchwald’s treat-
ment and the final film. After careful consideration of meetings, deal memos and story com-
parisons, Judge Harvey A. Schneider opined, in Phase 1 of the lawsuit, that the film was based
on Buchwald’s treatment.75 He also noted that the eventual director, John landis, had been sent
the treatment and considered as a director for the project. And, despite the court making clear
that the case was not about Murphy stealing the idea, his proven access to Buchwald’s treat-
ment was used as additional evidence in favour of Buchwald to show that the similarities were
not a coincidence.  yet, despite holding that Coming to america had been ‘based upon’
Buchwald’s treatment, the court refused to extend this to consider the law of torts – damages
that might stem from fraud or acting in bad faith.76
The result of Phase 1 of the lawsuit was that it established Buchwald and Bernheim were,
indeed, net profit participants in the film, as per their contracts with Paramount. Phase 2 set
about determining whether the contracts and business dealings were fair. Paramount’s argu-
ment was that, as both plaintiffs held net profit participation contracts, they were due no more
than their fixed compensation, as they claimed the film had made a net loss of $18 million.77
Challenged on this, the argument of Paramount’s counsel centred on the claim that while talent
with power make deals that guarantee them fees and percentages of gross profits, net profits
were deals made by the relatively powerless.78 Murphy, who earned over $20 million from the
film, even referred in his deposition testimony to net profit participation points as ‘monkey
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points’, so worthless were they usually to their recipients.79 However, the court examined
the net profit deductions, and Buchwald and Bernheim’s lawyers contested the studio’s jus-
tifications and accounting for the costs and revenues of the film. The court revealed that
Paramount had charged interest on the film’s negative costs, its distribution fee and its fee. It
also deducted 15 per cent of the gross for overhead on Eddie Murphy’s operational
allowance, and a further 15 per cent of this amount on top of the first charge.80 The court
thereby argued that this was, in effect, a double charge, an ‘overhead on overhead’, that had
no correspondence to any actual incurred costs. In response, Paramount attempted to
mount a ‘risky business’ defence, arguing that the Hollywood business relied on winners to
compensate for more numerous losses.81 However, when challenged by an unimpressed
Judge Schneider to allow an independent auditor to examine the Paramount accounting
books, the studio panicked and withdrew this defence to ensure that finances of all their films
were not placed in public view.
In his tentative decision, Judge Schneider called the contracts held by Buchwald and
Bernheim ‘overly harsh’ and ‘one sided’, forcing the plaintiffs to be ‘a party in a vastly inferior
bargaining position’.82 He ruled that the net profits contract was ‘unconscionable’ on seven
provisions and that Coming to america did, indeed, evolve from the two-page synopsis pre-
sented to Paramount by Buchwald and Bernheim, that Paramount’s accounting formula – an
industry-wide practice that limited the likelihood of any film ever reaching net profitability –
was unconscionable and that the parties had been subject to an unfair ‘contract of adhe-
sion’.83 Phase 3 of the lawsuit then moved to calculate the appropriate compensation for
Buchwald and Bernheim. Judge Schneider concluded that the Buchwald–Bernheim synopsis
was worth $900,000 ($150,000 to Buchwald and $750,000 to Bernheim), adding in provi-
sion for profit participation based on figures arrived at after removing a number of studio
deductions from net profits, and thus discounting the studio’s claims that the film had made
a loss.84 The case dragged on for two years, with escalating legal costs. Fearing that all their
books would be reopened for similar cases, Paramount filed an appeal, but eventually settled
with Buchwald and Bernheim for $900,000 just before the appellate court issued an opinion,
an attempt (according to industry commentators) to avoid the setting of a legal precedent
for future litigation by similarly aggrieved plaintiffs.85
The Buchwald v. Paramount lawsuit caused ripples across Hollywood as the major stu-
dios had never been fully challenged on their accounting deductions in court, and studio
executives feared the legal judgment would lead to a rush of lawsuits on similar grounds. It
was historically important, then, for a number of key reasons. First, Paramount had to dis-
close details of the contracts to prove how a film that had grossed over $288 million world-
wide had made a net loss, requiring no payment to net profit participants, and they failed
to convince the court of this. Second, Paramount were forced to abandon their ‘risky busi-
ness’ assertion that movie production was high risk and that wins are needed to offset the
studio losses, for fear that audits would fur ther expose the creative accounting and con-
tracting methods revealed in the court-room. The Buchwald v. Paramount lawsuit, therefore,
usefully scrutinised the contracts and profit definitions that typify contemporary film indus-
try deals, which are subject to the ‘creative accounting’ practices routinely adopted by
Hollywood studios.
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So did Buchwald v. Paramount change industry contracts? Despite the claims that the case
would overturn the way the studios calculate net profits, this is unproven. Further cases, such
as Batfilm Productions, inc. v. Warner Bros. (1994) did not reinforce the ‘unconscionable contract’
judgment made in this case.86 The relatively low level of payment made to the plaintiffs, when
their legal fees ran to over $2.5 million (luckily for the pair, borne by the law firm, who took the
case on a contingent fee basis) did not offer emphatic encouragement for future attempts.
Nonetheless, it did highlight the unequal nature of contracts in the industry, as well as a greater
recognition by talent and their agents of the need to carefully negotiate definitions of net prof-
its. Further cases demonstrate the relative power of Hollywood talent. For instance, another
surprising example of a recorded net loss, also leading to a lawsuit, concerned the film Forrest
Gump (1994). Despite earning $678 million at the box office and $382 million domestically, the
studio reported a net ‘loss’ of $62 million and no net profits for writer Winston Groom, who
was contracted for a fixed fee plus 3 per cent of net profits. The film declared this substantial
loss despite returning revenues to the studio through distribution ($128.3 million) and finance
($21.3 million).87
The Buchwald v. Paramount lawsuit is a landmark case, therefore, in that it publicly revealed
the disproportionate balancing of profit participation definitions for talent in favour of the
studio and the lucky few gross participants. yet, despite the court declaring that such net profits
contracts were unconscionable, such contracts continue to be common currency in Hollywood
and the case ultimately failed to transform studio accounting practices, which have grown even
more sophisticated. However, the case did reveal the industry machinery of lawyers, account-
ants and complex contractual clauses that structure contemporary Hollywood deals.
Contractual disputes such as those in Buchwald v. Paramount can, therefore, be seen as repre-
senting a power struggle between talent and the Hollywood studios, articulated through their
agents and lawyers.
hollywood Contracts into the twenty-first Century
For conglomerate Hollywood today, use of the seven-year option contract is more common-
place in television, where shows have the potential for long-running seasons and years of stable
production, than in major feature production, where the freelance deal has supplanted the
long-term studio contract. one of the most recent legal uses of the De Havilland law was by
the modern Family sitcom stars – Julie Bowen, Ty Burrell, Jesse Tyler Ferguson, Ed o’Neil, Eric
Stonestreet and Sofia Vergara – in July 2012, when table readings for the upcoming fourth
season were due to begin.88 The lead actors brought a lawsuit in lA Superior Court against
20th Century-Fox TV as contract renegotiations for higher salaries with the company came to
a stalemate. What is interesting, however, is their reason for bringing a case against their
employers: their original contracts, signed with Fox TV, ‘violate California’s seven-year limit on
personal service contracts’. Variety made the analogy to de Havilland on 24 July 2012, remark-
ing that this legal precedent ‘was established in 1944 after actress olivia de Havilland waged a
long contract fight against Warner Bros.’.89 The trade journal went on to highlight the precise
difference between de Havilland’s long-term studio contract and the modern Family stars’ TV
sitcom deal. ‘In common industry practice, actors starting out on a series sign deals that run for
seven television seasons. Depending on the time an actor is signed up for the pilot, the term
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often runs longer than seven years.’90 like Warner Bros.’ attempt to tack on the accumulated
suspension time on the end of de Havilland’s contract in 1943, the TV talent contract based on
show seasons as opposed to actual calendar time is a violation of Section 2855, and the lead
actors of modern Family argued this point – Vergara had originally signed up with ABC in 2007
to a holding deal before she was assigned to modern Family in october 2008, while Bowen,
Burrell, Ferguson and Stonestreet all asserted that their contracts should end in February 2016,
as opposed to June 2016.91
Ultimately, the case never went to court, as three days later, on 27 July, the actors reached
a deal with 20th Century-Fox TV. Cynthia littleton, for Variety, noted that ‘the family drama is
over’, and explained that, although ‘details of the deal’ were ‘sketchy’, it was understood that the
actors agreed to an additional season, higher salaries and won a key provision – a syndication
deal.92 Although the actors only achieved a quarter point share, the article underscored its sig-
nificance in the long run, given that the show is expected to ‘gross hundreds of millions in syn-
dication’: ‘Achieving a profit participation stake, however small, had been an important point to
the thesps.’93 She elaborated on this point, stating that the actors had been wrangling with the
studio for over a year about getting a cut of modern Family’s syndication earnings. This was the
crucial bargaining point for the actors rather than the actual calendar time of their seven season
contracts. Nonetheless, this legal technicality established by the De Havilland law brought 20th
Century-Fox TV to the bargaining table; as Variety noted in their coverage of the deal, use of
that lawsuit was ‘a ploy to take the dispute public and force the studio to sweeten its offer’.94
Conclusion
This chapter has illuminated the legal terms of the talent contract and considered how the
resulting precedents established by California case law have shaped Hollywood’s industrial prac-
tices, particularly in terms of high-profile above-the-line talent contract negotiations. Both de
Haviland v. Warner Bros. and Buchwald v. Paramount are landmark cases that reveal important
and contested aspects of contractual battles in Hollywood’s history that are still relevant in the
industry today. However, further analysis of Hollywood contract negotiations faces significant
research challenges in terms of access to primary sources. Although the de Haviland v. Warner
Bros. legal materials are available at the USC Warner Bros. Archive in los Angeles, and the
Buchwald case is available from the lA Superior Court files, this access remains a novelty for
studying contracts and legal dealings of the Hollywood studios. likewise, there is a paucity of
primary documents through which to analyse the media industries of conglomerate
Hollywood. The data is not available for researchers, who therefore have to draw on a range
of other methods. one key resource for accessing contemporary industry contracts is through
litigation in the lA Superior Court, since these documents become public record.95 Moreover,
the major talent agencies – William Morris Endeavor, Creative Artists Agency, United Talent
Agency and the contemporary studios – do not make their archives accessible to researchers,
presumably for reasons of commercial confidentiality. In addition, the majority of lawsuits are
settled before they go to a legal decision, so consequently are unable to establish a precedent
in case law, and out-of-court settlements are usually kept confidential. This presents substantial
challenges for scholars wishing to produce an accurate history of Hollywood’s legal contracts,
as most accessible contracts are either concerning contractual disputes (which become matters
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of legal record) or standard ‘boiler plate’ contract agreements, such as those negotiated by the
major guilds (DGA, SAG and WGA).
We should also note additional issues of method in using secondary sources such as trade
journals to examine the brokering of deals. Industry trade and newspaper articles are a vital
and valuable resource to trace key events and trends of the business due to the scarcity of
access to conglomerate Hollywood contracts and corporate records.96 Hence, scholars utilise
the trades and press in addition to new media outlets like industry insider blogs such as
deadline Hollywood and The Wrap to study the media industries of today. However, frothy spec-
ulation about talent and box office has long been used by agents and studios for creating pub-
licity around their projects, with Variety and The Hollywood Reporter being important industry
journals in this respect, so we also require a critical view of the relationship between the trade
papers and the industry they report on.
In this chapter, we have not only analysed Hollywood contracts, but also considered their
impact on the talent, as both employees and labourers. In doing so, we have highlighted the
importance of comprehending contracts and their clauses and of deciphering Hollywood’s cre-
ative accounting. Thus, to fully understand these deal structures, we must unpack complex legal
documents and digest their numerous pages of clauses. At the same time, we also echo Jane
Gaines in being cognisant to what she calls the ‘truth status’ of contracts, which can become
seductive in their apparent authority.97 Contracts tend to be most relevant when matters reach
dispute and go to court. While they rarely reveal simple industry axioms of film authorship or
creative decision-making, contracts do inform and regulate the conditions of film production.
Nevertheless, as this chapter has illustrated, contracts can also be an instrument of agency and
power as well as oppression/control, especially in Hollywood.
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